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2.1 Introduction
The postwar Japanese ﬁnancial system has been known as a bank-
centered system, in which banks played a central role in corporate ﬁnance
and governance. The mainstream view in the literature on economic his-
tory argued that the bank-centered system has a long history in Japan with
its origin dating all the way back to the late nineteenth century, when Japan
embarked upon its modern economic development (Bank of Japan, Insti-
tute for Monetary and Economic Studies 1986, 1995; Ishii 1997, 1999). Re-
cent empirical studies have established, however, that the prewar Japanese
economic system in general was substantially diﬀerent from the postwar
system, and, in particular, the ﬁnancial system was characterized by large
and active securities market with shareholders (not bankers) playing the
central role in corporate ﬁnance and governance (Fujino and Teranishi
2000; Miwa and Ramseyer 2002; Okazaki 1995, 1999a,b, 2000; Okazaki,
Sawada, and Yokoyama 2005; Hoshi and Kashyap 2001; Teranishi 2003).
The empirical evidence to support the importance of the stock market in
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Listing Policy and Development 
of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
in the Prewar Period
Yasushi Hamao, Takeo Hoshi, and Tetsuji Okazakiprewar Japan mostly comes from the data from the 1920s and the 1930s.
Although the data constraint becomes more severe as we move back time,
a closer look at the earlier period reveals that the size of the Japanese stock
market was relatively small during the ﬁrst forty years of its existence. Then
it took oﬀto be a very active and important source of industrial funds. It is
not surprising that the stock market started small, but it continued to be
(relatively) small for the next forty years and then started to grow rather
suddenly.
This chapter asks why the Japanese stock market developed in the way it
did in the prewar period. To do this, we examine the development of the
Tokyo Stock Exchange (Tokyo Kabushiki Torihikijo, TSE hereafter), which
was established as the ﬁrst stock exchange in Japan in 1878 and grew to be
the largest stock exchange in prewar Japan.1Although the TSE was the ﬁrst
formal stock exchange in Japan and continued its dominance (except for a
brief period in the late 1890s when many new stock exchanges were estab-
lished), its absolute size was relatively small in the ﬁrst forty years. More-
over, for these forty years, most of the companies listed on the TSE operated
locally in Tokyo and nearby areas. We ask why the TSE stayed small and lo-
cal for a substantial time after its establishment in 1878 and why it rather
suddenly started to grow in the late 1910s to eventually become a sizable
stock exchange with the nationwide scope in the following decade.
There has been little research on the prewar Japanese stock exchanges,
especially for the period before the 1920s.2 The main impediment has been
the diﬃculty of obtaining data. Thus, one contribution of this chapter is
the compilation of relevant data that used to be scattered around in vari-
ous places. For example, we have constructed a comprehensive list of the
companies listed on the TSE for each year from 1878 to 1936 from internal
documents at the TSE and various other supplementary materials. The
database has been augmented by adding company attributes such as in-
dustry classiﬁcation, size, and the year of establishment.
We have also built another panel database, which contains basic ﬁnan-
cial information for all the cotton spinning companies that include both
listed and nonlisted companies. The database contains 142 companies for
the period of 1905 to 1936. This database allows us to examine the listing
decision of each ﬁrm on the TSE.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents an over-
view of ﬁnancial system and stock market in prewar Japan and conﬁrms the
importance of the stock market in the prewar ﬁnancial system. Section 2.3
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1. When the exchange was reorganized and reopened under the occupation of the Allied
Forces in 1949, the Japanese name was changed to Tokyo Sho ¯ken Torihikijo(literally meaning
Tokyo Securities Exchange). The English name, however, continued to be Tokyo Stock Ex-
change.
2. The important exceptions that we are aware of are Shimura (1970), Noda (1980), and
Kataoka (1987).examines the development of the TSE in the prewar period. We ﬁnd that the
market was initially small and the listed companies were predominantly
those in the Tokyo area. The TSE, however, started to grow suddenly in the
late 1910s. Section 2.4 argues that the sudden spurt of growth cannot be ex-
plained by macroeconomic conditions such as the World War I boom. Sec-
tion 2.5 studies the changes in the listing requirements in the TSE over time
to see how the growth of the TSE was inﬂuenced by changes in its listing
criteria and listing policy. Section 2.6 proposes a theoretical argument that
can explain the development path of the TSE in the prewar period. The ex-
planation focuses on an externality in a company’s decision to list on a
stock exchange: one company’s decision to list on a stock exchange may in-
crease the attractiveness of the stock exchange to other companies by in-
creasing the size of the market. Section 2.7 uses the database for cotton
spinning ﬁrms and analyzes their listing decisions and obtains the result
that is consistent with the argument in section 2.6. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Japanese Stock Market in the Prewar Financial System: An Overview
The size of the stock market in prewar Japan was substantial. Figure 2.1
shows the total market value of the stocks listed on all the stock exchanges
in Japan divided by gross national product (GNP; gross domestic product
[GDP] after 1955). In the prewar period, this ratio was around 1.0, which
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Fig. 2.1 Stock market development in Japan: 1928–2000
Sources: TSE, Tokyo Stock Exchange Annual Statistics, various issues; TSE, TSE Factbook
(2004), Okawa (1974), Cabinet Oﬃce Socio-Economic Research Institute (2001).is substantially higher than that in the postwar period, except during the
stock market boom in the late 1980s. In particular, the ratio was consis-
tently lower than 0.3 in the postwar high-growth period (1951 to 1973).
The prewar stock market was large also in terms of the transaction vol-
ume. Just before the start of Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the total volume
of the shares traded on all the exchanges was 2 to 2.5 times greater than
GNP. On the other hand, the ratio was only 0.1 to 0.6 in the high-growth
period, and it was lower than 1.0 even in the stock market boom of the late
1980s.
Table 2.1 compares the size of the prewar Japanese stock market to that
of the prewar stock market in the United States and those of the stock mar-
kets in various countries (including Japan and the United States) in the early
1990s. The international data for the 1990s come from Demirguc-Kunt and
Levine (2001), who report three measures of the stock market size for sixty-
one countries: total market value of the listed stocks divided by GDP, the
total value of the stocks traded in a year divided by GDP, and the latter di-
vided by the former (turnover ratio). For comparison, we added data for
Japan and the United States in 1936. The table shows that even though
Japan was much less developed than the United States, the stock market 
in Japan in 1936 was much larger and more actively traded than that in the
United States in 1936. Even compared with most of the countries (includ-
ing Japan itself) in the 1990s, Japan’s stock market in 1936 was much larger.
Another way to see the importance of the stock market in prewar Japan
is to examine the sources of funds for corporations. Table 2.2, which re-
produces table 2.3 in Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, 36), shows the sources of
funds for the private nonﬁnancial corporate sector in prewar Japan. The
original source of the data is Fujino and Teranishi (2000), which is consid-
ered to be the deﬁnitive work on the prewar pattern of corporate ﬁnancing.
The table shows the average proportion of each source of funds calculated
from the levels of claims for three (overlapping) subperiods: 1902 to 1915,
1914 to 1929, and 1928 to 1940. Each subperiod uses a diﬀerent primary
data source for estimation.3
Table 2.2 shows that the shareholders contributed the majority of funds
in each of the three subperiods. The proportion of paid-in capital and re-
serves was about 60 percent to 80 percent of the total capital and liabilities.
In contrast, the proportion of the bank borrowings was small. Even if we
assume all the borrowings come from banks and interpret all the bills
payable as disguised bank borrowings (because some ﬁrms had their own
bills discounted by banks), the amount of bank borrowings was never
higher than 20 percent of the total funds in the corporate sector.
Having conﬁrmed the importance of the use of equity and the stock mar-
ket in the prewar Japanese ﬁnancial system, let us now look at how it all
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3. See the note for table 2.3 in Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, 36) for more details on the pri-
mary sources of data.Table 2.1 International comparison of stock market size
GDP Total 
per capita, Market  value 
1990–1995 capitalization/ traded/ Turnover
(US$) GDP GDP ratio
Japan 1936 830 1.17 1.32 1.12
United States 1936 6,727 0.72 0.25 0.34
Argentina 4,039 0.11 0.04 0.34
Australia 14,314 0.71 0.33 0.43
Austria 13,177 0.12 0.08 0.64
Bangladesh 194 0.04 0.01 0.09
Barbados 4,777 0.21 0.00 0.02
Belgium 14,482 0.36 0.05 0.15
Bolivia 755 0.02 0.00 0.01
Brazil 2,346 0.19 0.12 0.56
Canada 17,285 0.59 0.29 0.47
Chile 2,725 0.84 0.09 0.10
Colombia 1,432 0.13 0.01 0.10
Costa Rica 1,867 0.07 0.00 0.03
Cyprus 6,588 0.22 0.02 0.11
Denmark 17,023 0.34 0.16 0.45
Ecuador 1,322 0.10 0.01 0.14
Egypt 1,042 0.10 0.02 0.14
Finland 15,892 0.29 0.12 0.34
France 15,232 0.33 0.17 0.50
Germany 16,573 0.24 0.28 1.13
Ghana 533 0.15 0.00 0.03
Great Britain 11,794 1.13 0.55 0.48
Greece 6,552 0.15 0.06 0.36
Honduras 751 0.05 0.02 0.67
Hong Kong 10,538 1.96 1.08 0.52
Iceland 18,940 0.01 0.08 n.a.
India 385 0.28 0.08 0.35
Indonesia 609 0.18 0.08 0.45
Iran 2,397 0.04 0.01 0.21
Ireland 9,014 0.26 0.14 0.62
Israel 9,260 0.33 0.19 0.70
Italy 11,505 0.17 0.08 0.42
Jamaica 1,711 0.42 0.05 0.10
Japan 15,706 0.79 0.28 0.36
Jordan 1,289 0.65 0.12 0.20
Kenya 441 0.16 0.00 0.03
Korea 3,909 0.37 0.44 1.22
Malaysia 2,929 2.01 1.14 0.50
Mauritius 2,125 0.27 0.01 0.05
Mexico 2,952 0.32 0.13 0.41
Nepal 200 0.05 0.00 0.04
The Netherlands 13,955 0.69 0.43 0.56
New Zealand 9,492 0.49 0.14 0.27
Nigeria 551 0.06 0.00 0.01
(continued )Norway 20,135 0.26 0.14 0.53
Pakistan 436 0.16 0.06 0.34
Panama 1,950 0.09 0.00 0.04
Peru 1,292 0.11 0.04 0.30
The Philippines 734 0.52 0.15 0.26
Portugal 4,822 0.13 0.05 0.38
Singapore 11,152 1.37 0.70 0.50
South Africa 2,379 1.66 0.12 0.08
Spain 7,286 0.30 0.23 0.63
Sri Lanca 538 0.16 0.02 0.12
Sweden 18,982 0.62 0.33 0.47
Switzerland 19,530 0.98 0.76 0.74
Thailand 1,503 0.57 0.40 0.77
Trinidad and Tobago 3,685 0.01 0.10 n.a.
Tunisia 1,534 0.10 0.01 0.09
Turkey 2,259 0.14 0.16 1.04
United States 19,414 0.80 0.62 0.73
Urguay 2,514 0.01 0.00 0.03
Venezuela 3,167 0.12 0.03 0.26
Zimbabwe 804 0.23 0.01 0.07
Mean 6,547 0.39 0.17 0.35
Notes: Except for Japan 1936 and United States 1936 data, numbers are taken from De-
murgüc-Kunt and Levine (2001). The data for Japan 1936 are from TSE (1937), except for the
GNP data. Per capita GNP for Japan in 1936 is computed by dividing the GNP ﬁgure in
Okawa (1974) by the population ﬁgure in Umemura (1988). It is the converted into U.S. dol-
lars at the exchange rate in 1936 and translated to the 1990–1996 value by using GDP deﬂa-
tors in Gordon (1986) and the U.S. Council of Economic Advisors (2003). The U.S. 1936 data
except for GNP ﬁgure are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1937). Per capita GNP for the
U.S. in 1936 is computed by dividing the GNP ﬁgure in Gordon (1986) by the population ﬁg-
ure from the U.S. Bureau of Census (1937). It is then translated into the 1990–1995 value by
using GDP deﬂators in Gordon (1986) and the U.S. Council of Economic Advisors (2003).
Means do not include Japan 1936 and United States 1936. United States 1936 data include
New York Stock Exchange only. n.a. means data not available.
Table 2.1 (continued)
GDP Total 
per capita, Market  value 
1990–1995 capitalization/ traded/ Turnover
(US$) GDP GDP ratio
Table 2.2 Funding patterns of Japanese corporations: 1902–1940
Paid-in capital  Corporate  Bills 
Time period and reserves bonds Borrowings payable
1902–1915 82.3 9.5 3.2 5.1
1914–1929 74.8 14.9 4.1 6.2
1928–1940 66.4 18.5 6.7 8.4
Source: Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, 36, table 2.3).
Note: This table shows the percentage distribution of paid-in capital and debt.started. Following the enactment of the Stock Exchange Act (Kabushiki
Torihikijo Jo ¯rei) in 1878 (ten years after the Meiji Restoration), the TSE was
established as the ﬁrst stock exchange in Japan. The Stock Exchange Act
prescribed that a stock exchange must obtain a license from the govern-
ment and that it must be organized as a joint-stock company with capital
of 100,000 yen or larger (approximately 567 million yen in 2005 prices).4
The Osaka Stock Exchange (Osaka Kabushiki Torihikijo, OSE) followed
the TSE in the same year. Although the Ministry of Finance initially in-
tended to license only the two stock exchanges, it changed the policy in
1880 and allowed new exchanges to be established, including Yokohama
(1880), Kobe (1883), Kyoto (1884), and Nagoya (1886) (TSE 2002, 7).
In 1887, the Exchange Act (Torihikijo Jo ¯rei,also known as the Bourse Act)
was passed, which prescribed that all the exchanges, including the stock ex-
changes, must be membership organizations, not joint-stock companies.
The existing stock exchanges were to be abolished when their current li-
censes expired and to restart as a new membership organization (TSE 2002,
16). The new regulation met strong resistance from the industry and was re-
placed by the new Exchange Act (Torihikijo Ho ¯) in 1893. The new Exchange
Act allowed each exchange to choose between a membership organization
and a joint-stock company organization. The law continued to provide the
legal basis of the exchanges throughout the rest of the prewar period.
The Exchange Act of 1893 also reduced the minimum capital of an ex-
change (that chose to organize as a joint-stock company) to 30,000 yen. The
reduction of the minimum capital level led to the establishment of many
new stock exchanges during the economic boom in the late 1890s. Some of
the newly established exchanges, however, failed to generate active trading,
which convinced the government to shut down small stock exchanges in ru-
ral areas (TSE 1928, 6–8; TSE 2002, 16–18; Noda 1980, 240–42).
The bar graph in ﬁgure 2.2 shows the evolution of the number of stock
exchanges during this period. The number of stock exchanges began with
two (Tokyo and Osaka) in 1878. While it increased to ﬁve in 1886, it de-
creased to three in 1891. Then a rapid increase in the number of exchanges
began in 1894 as the new Exchange Act with a lower minimum capital
standard took eﬀect, and reached a peak of forty-six in 1897. After that it
declined again, and has remained around ten throughout the rest of the
prewar period.
Figure 2.2 also shows the total revenue of all stock exchanges (in solid
line) and the percentage share of the TSE and OSE (in broken lines) rev-
enues. As long-term data on the volume of stocks traded at all the exchanges
are not available, we use the revenues (a major part of which was from trade
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4. This is inﬂated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). We linked CPI of Okawa et al. 1967
(134) with CPI by the Statistics Bureau of Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications
at 1955.commissions) as a proxy for the level of activities in the stock exchanges.
The ﬁgure shows the total revenue of stock exchanges experienced two sig-
niﬁcant upward jumps: once from 1904 to 1906 and again from 1918 to
1922. The TSE continued to have the largest revenue throughout these
years, except in 1922 when the OSE topped the rankings.5 The share of the
TSE started around 60 to 70 percent, but declined to 20 to 30 percent in the
late 1890s, when the number of stock exchanges increased sharply, and then
returned to 40 to 50 percent after that.
2.3 Development of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
This section examines the development of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in
more detail. The stock market at the TSE was divided into two divisions.
The Stock Exchange Act of 1878 classiﬁed stock transactions into spot
transactions (genba torihiki) and futures transactions (teiki torihiki). Each
spot contract required actual delivery of the traded shares.6 Teiki torihiki
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5. The extraordinarily large revenue of the OSE in 1922 resulted from an acquisition of an-
other company. Thus, we can safely say that the TSE had the largest revenue from transaction
commissions throughout the prewar period.
6. The Japanese name for spot transaction was changed three times during the prewar pe-
riod. The Exchange Act of 1893 called it jiki torihiki. The organizational reform of the TSE
in 1918 discussed in the following introduced the name genbutsu torihiki. Finally, the 1922 re-
vision of the Exchange Act used jitsubutsu torihiki.
Fig. 2.2 Number of stock exchanges and the revenue share of the TSE
Sources: Toyo Keizai Shinposha (1927); Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Handbook of
Exchanges (various issues).were similar to “time bargains,” which were also observed in the ﬁnancial
centers in more advanced economies, such as London and New York.7 In
a teiki torihiki, a buyer (seller) could resell (repurchase) the stocks as many
times as he wished, until the delivery date, and at the delivery date only the
diﬀerence between the sell and the purchase was settled in cash (TSE 1928,
454). In the futures market, net cash settlement was the normal settlement
method.
Before the revision of the Exchange Act in 1922, the futures market
traded contracts with three diﬀerent settlement days for each individual
stock.8The shares sold had to be delivered before the settlement day, which
was one day before the last trading day of the month (called to ¯giri), one day
before the last trading day of the next month (called nakagiri), or one day
before the last trading day of the month after the next month (called saki-
giri). Thus, the settlement period (the period between the start date of a
transaction and the delivery date) never exceeded three months.
The 1922 revision of the Exchange Act ordered the exchanges to develop
another type of future contracts with settlement period no longer than
seven days. Following this legal change, the TSE introduced a new market
for the type of transactions called the short-term futures transaction (tanki
seisan torihiki) in 1924.9 In the short-term futures, the deliveries of all the
transactions that took place in the morning session of a day and in the
afternoon session of the previous day had to happen by 2:00 P.M.of the day.
The traders were allowed to postpone delivery up to a month, but they were
required to pay a deferment fee in such a case.
The new Exchange Act also shortened the maximum settlement period
for any futures trading from three months to two months. The old futures
market of the TSE, which was now renamed the long-term futures trans-
actions (cho ¯ki seisan torihiki), continued to use the system of three settle-
ment days by changing those to the 15th of an odd month, and the 5th and
the 25th of an even month.
Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of the number of stocks listed on each
market of the TSE. Note that it is distinct “stocks,” not companies, that are
counted here. Large companies in prewar Japan often issued more than
one class of shares with diﬀerent proportions of paid-in parts. As a result,
in 1915, for example, while the number of listed stock names was 227, the
number of listed companies was 160, which meant one company issued
1.42 classes of shares, on average. As a concrete example, consider a com-
pany that had issued 20,000 shares, whose face value was 50 yen each, and
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7. For a brief description of “time bargains” in London, see Michie (1999, 48–49). For
New York, see Geisst (1997, 14).
8. Tokyo Stock Exchange (1932, 70–96) contains a detailed discussion of various transac-
tions in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Other sources for the discussion here include Osaka Stock
Exchange (1928), Tokyo Stock Exchange (1928), and Kuwata (1940).
9. The Osaka Stock Exchange introduced the short-term futures in 1922 immediately fol-
lowing the enactment of the 1922 Exchange Act.the capital was all paid-in. The total paid-in capital of the company is 1 mil-
lion yen. Now suppose this company issues another 20,000 shares with face
value of 50 yen each. Under the prewar practice of installment payment of
capital, the company collects only a portion of the face value from the
shareholders at the issuance. If the company collects 50 percent, the paid-
in face value of the new stocks is 25 yen each, and the new total paid-in cap-
ital of the company becomes 1.5 million yen. This creates two distinct
classes of stocks of the same company, which will be listed as two diﬀerent
stocks on an exchange.
Note also that all the stocks listed on the short-term futures market (af-
ter 1924) were also listed on the long-term futures market, and all the
stocks listed on the long-term futures market were also listed on the spot
market. Thus, the number of the stocks on the spot market is always larger
than the number of the stocks on the long-term futures market, which in
turn is larger than the number of the stocks on the short-term futures mar-
ket. Finally, the number of stocks listed in the futures market is missing for
the period between 1918 and 1922, presumably lost in the ﬁre that com-
pletely destroyed the Tokyo Stock Exchange building during the Great
Kanto Earthquake of 1923.
The number of the listed stocks began with four (First National Bank,
Tokyo Kabutocho Rice Exchange, Tokyo Kakigaracho Rice Exchange,
and the Tokyo Stock Exchange itself) in 1878. Until 1896, all of the listed
stocks were listed on both the spot market and the (long-term) futures mar-
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Fig. 2.3 Number of listed stocks on the TSE
Source: TSE (1938).ket, and after that a small number of stocks emerged that were listed only
on the spot market.
Figure 2.3 shows that there was a small upward jump in the number of
listed shares in 1897 followed by a slight increase in the trend growth rate
of the listed shares. A larger jump and a more drastic change in the trend
growth happened in 1918. The number of listed stocks increased sharply
from 233 to 402 in one year and then continued to grow. In the ten years
from 1918 to 1927, the number of listed stocks increased each year by sev-
enty-eight, on average. The growth is compared to a little less than six per
year during the previous forty years. The short-term futures market started
in 1924, but the number of stocks listed on the short-term futures market
was very small. It was just thirty-six in 1936.
Figure 2.4 shows the total amount of (the book value of) paid-in capital
of the stocks listed on the TSE. Figure 2.5 plots the same series divided by
the nominal GNP of each year. Both ﬁgures are qualitatively similar to ﬁg-
ure 2.3. The only notable exception is that the series start to decline after
1932 in ﬁgure 2.5, which suggests the growth of the book value of the listed
companies started to fall behind the growth of GNP in the 1930s.
In ﬁgure 2.1 and table 2.1, we saw that the Japanese stock market in the
1920s and the 1930s was very large compared to the size of the economy.
Figures 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 suggest, however, the TSE was relatively small be-
fore the 1920s. The size of the market measured in the total book value of
listed ﬁrms divided by GNP increased steadily from less than 5 percent in
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Fig. 2.4 Total book value of listed stocks on the TSE
Source: TSE (1938).1885 to around 20 percent in 1920 (ﬁgure 2.5). The size during this period
increased only by 0.5 percentage point every year on average. In the next
three years, the size of the market jumped to 50 percent of GNP and con-
tinued to grow. In the twelve years from 1919 to 1931, the proportion of the
TSE to GNP increased by 4.2 percentage point every year, on average.
Although data constraints prevent us from extending ﬁgure 2.1 back to
the period before the 1920s, what happened in the TSE, the largest stock
market in Japan, suggests that the size of the Japanese stock market as a
whole was also relatively small before the 1920s. The growth rate of the
market (measured in the book value of listed stocks) was rather small be-
fore the late 1910s, and then the market suddenly took oﬀduring the 1920s.
Before the 1920s, the TSE was also limited in its regional coverage: the
listed companies were mostly from the eastern part of Japan. Over time,
however, the TSE attracted companies from all over Japan and eventually
became a nationwide stock market. Let us brieﬂy trace changes in the re-
gional distribution of the listed companies. Appendix A explains the
sources of the data that we use here.
Table 2.3 shows the regional distribution of the headquarters of listed
companies on the TSE. All the four listed companies in 1878 were located
in Tokyo. Although the proportion of the companies in Tokyo declined to
50 percent by 1885, the share for the eastern Japan was still higher than 90
percent. The share of companies in the eastern Japan remained high
(around 80 percent) in 1900 and 1915, but started to fall after that. The tim-
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Fig. 2.5 Total face value of listed stocks on the TSE (ratio to GNP)
Sources: TSE (1938); Okawa (1974).ing coincides of the acceleration of the number of listed stocks at the TSE
that we saw above. By 1935, the proportion of the listed companies in the
eastern Japan declined to 72 percent, while the proportion of the listed
companies in the Kinki region increased to 15 percent. Thus, over time, the
TSE became the exchange with nationwide coverage.
2.4 Macroeconomic Condition and Growth of the TSE
The TSE grew to become the largest stock exchange in Japan with na-
tionwide coverage, but the growth was rather slow, and the listed ﬁrms were
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Table 2.3 Regional distribution of companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange:
1887–1935
1878 1885 1900 1915 1925 1935
Total 4 24 96 151 695 899
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
East 4 22 77 121 536 650
(100.0) (91.7) (80.2) (80.7) (77.1) (72.3)
Hokkaido 004279
(0.0) (0.0) (4.2) (1.3) (1.0) (1.0)
Tohoku 02008 1 6
(0.0) (8.3) (0.0) (0.0) (1.2) (1.8)
Kanto 4 17 67 110 487 569
(100.0) (70.8) (69.8) (73.3) (70.1) (63.3)
Tokyo 4 12 54 89 440 506
(100.0) (50.0) (56.3) (59.3) (63.3) (56.3)
Chubu 0369 3 4 5 6
(0.0) (12.5) (6.3) (6.0) (4.9) (6.2)
West 0 2 19 22 105 171
(0.0) (8.3) (19.8) (14.7) (15.1) (19.0)
Kinki 0 2 11 16 82 135
(0.0) (8.3) (11.5) (10.7) (11.8) (15.0)
Osaka 0 2 4 13 66 105
(0.0) (8.3) (4.2) (8.7) (9.5) (11.7)
Chugoku 0032 1 1 1 7
(0.0) (0.0) (3.1) (1.3) (1.6) (1.9)
Shikoku 000015
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.6)
Kyushu 0055 1 1 1 4
(0.0) (0.0) (5.2) (2.7) (1.6) (1.6)
Colonies 0007 3 2 4 2
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (4.7) (4.6) (4.7)
Foreign 0000 2 2 3 6
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (3.2) (4.0)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are percentages.
Source: The data are from the authors’ calculation based on the database discussed in ap-
pendix A.skewed to eastern Japan during the ﬁrst forty years of its existence. Why
did the TSE originally list relatively small number of stocks but rather sud-
denly start to list increasing number (and capitalization) of stocks? This
and the next sections consider two types of possible explanations: one fo-
cusing on macroeconomic conditions and the other focusing on TSE rules
on listing new stocks.
It is important to note that the growth of the stock market after the late
1910s was not just a result of accumulation of retained earnings within the
ﬁrms that had already been listed. As ﬁgure 2.5 clearly shows, the stock 
exchange grew by listing new stocks on the market. Thus, the explanation
must include some changes in listing behavior as its key component.
The period when the TSE experienced the very rapid growth coincides
with the boom during and after the World War I. Japan joined the war, 
but it was far from major theaters of war and did not feel disruptive eﬀects
of the war very much. Rather, the war presented opportunities for many
Japanese businesses to expand their operations in Asia at the cost of West-
ern European business interest. Thus, World War I was a boon to the
Japanese economy in general and for its stock market in particular.
Figure 2.6shows monthly series of stock price index and wholesale price
index from July 1914 to December 1936. Both series are made by the Bank
of Japan and taken from the Ministry of Finance (various issues). Both in-
dexes are normalized to 100 in July 1914. We indeed ﬁnd that the stock
price appreciated sharply as the war prolonged and stayed high until the
crash in 1920. The stock price in 1917 and again right before the crash was
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Fig. 2.6 Wholesale price index and stock price index (July 1914   100)
Source: Ministry of Finance, Reference Book on Financial Issues (various issues).more than double the level in 1914. The WWI boom led to inﬂation as well.
Measured in wholesale prices, the price level almost tripled between 1914
and 1920.
Thus, the macroeconomic condition in the late 1910s seemed to have
been very favorable for the development of a stock market. The apprecia-
tion of stock prices, however, ended with a crash in 1920 as ﬁgure 2.6
shows. The WWI boom expanded deﬁcit in the balance of payments, which
prompted the Bank of Japan to tighten the monetary policy. The Bank of
Japan discount rate, which was at 5.11 percent at the end of 1917, was
raised twice each year 1918 and 1919 and reached 8.03 percent by the end
of November 1919. In March 1920, the TSE experienced a crash, which
spilled over to the commodities markets as well. Many stock and com-
modity exchanges (including the TSE and the OSE) temporarily sus-
pended the trading. The ﬁnancial crisis reached its peak in May, when the
Seventy-Fourth Bank, a large bank in Yokohama that specialized in export
ﬁnance, failed, which subsequently triggered failures of smaller banks and
trading houses.
The high inﬂation, which tends to encourage investors to shift their in-
vestment from bank deposits to stock markets, also ended in 1920. Japan
in the 1920s was mostly deﬂationary, but the listings on the TSE continued
to grow well into the 1920s. This suggests it was more than just the WWI
boom that caused the growth of the TSE.
Comparing the TSE with other stock markets that also beneﬁted from
the WWI boom conﬁrms this point. Figure 2.7 shows the number of listed
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Fig. 2.7 Number of stocks listed: Tokyo, Osaka, and New York stock exchanges
Sources: TSE (1938); Osaka Stock Exchange, Business Report (various issues), New York
Stock Exchange, Fact Book (www.nyse.com).stocks on the New York Stock Exchange and the OSE, and compares those
to the number of listed stocks on the TSE. The United States, like Japan,
did not suﬀer very much from the WWI, and the economy and stock mar-
kets experienced huge boom in the 1920s. As ﬁgure 2.7 shows, the New
York Stock Exchange added new listings in the late 1910s and the 1920s,
but the growth rate was not very diﬀerent from that of the early 1910s. We
do not observe a kink in the late 1910s as we do for the TSE listings. We
make similar observations for the listings on the OSE. The remarkable and
sustained increase in the new listings that we see for the TSE is absent for
the OSE. We conclude that the WWI boom is not suﬃcient to explain the
sudden growth of the TSE in the 1910s.
2.5 Listing Criteria and Growth of the TSE
What can explain the sudden take oﬀ of the TSE, then? One possible ex-
planation of the pattern of the growth of listed companies on the TSE is the
relaxation of listing criteria over time. When a stock exchange starts its op-
eration, it may want to restrict the companies that are listed to be only
those that have high proﬁtability or sizable assets to establish the reputa-
tion that the exchange deals with quality companies. As the exchange ac-
cumulates the reputation over time, it may be able to relax the tight listing
regulation marginally, allowing more companies to be listed on the ex-
change. If we ﬁnd that the TSE indeed relaxed the listing criteria around
1918, then it could explain the sudden growth of the TSE after that time.
This turns out not to be the case, however. The long-term futures mar-
ket indeed had listing criteria that were relaxed over time, but there was no
important change in 1918 (or nearby years). Perhaps more important, in
the spot market, where most of rapid growth after 1918 took place, the TSE
does not seem to have imposed any listing restrictions.
Let us ﬁrst look at the changes in the listing criteria to the futures mar-
ket. We are not aware of any document that summarizes the listing criteria
at the TSE for the whole prewar period. Thus, we need to put together the
relevant information scattered in various places.
The earliest mention of the listing restriction that we can ﬁnd is in TSE
(1928):
When the Exchange Act was passed in 1893, the government instructed
the TSE to increase the number of stocks traded as much as possible.
Consequently, the TSE replaced the existing listing criteria (number of
stocks no fewer than 4,000, total face value not less than 200,000 yen,
and total paid-in face value not less than 100,000 yen) with the new cri-
teria (number of stocks no fewer than 3,000, total face value not less than
150,000 yen, and total paid-in face value not less than 75,000 yen). The
TSE decided that the stocks that do not satisfy the new criteria should
be traded only on the spot market. The new criteria were used from May
1894. (33–34)
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ties on the futures market required an approval from the Ministry of Agri-
culture and Commerce (MAC). Accordingly, the MAC set the following
listing criteria for the futures market.
(i) Issuing ﬁrm must have been established more than 2 years ago.
(ii) Total paid-in face value (of the newly listed class of shares) must
not be less than 1,000,000 yen to be listed on the Tokyo or Osaka stock
exchange.
(iii) Total paid-in face value (of the newly listed class of shares) must
not be less than 500,000 yen to be listed on a stock exchange other than
Tokyo and Osaka. (TSE 1963, Part on Institutions and Organizations, 3)
Compared with the 1894 TSE rule that we saw earlier (75,000 yen mini-
mum paid-in face value), the new MAC rule tightened the listing standard
by increasing the minimum paid-in face value by more than 1,300 percent,
while the general price level only doubled over the twenty years.
In 1915, the MAC added the following criteria for newly listing class of
shares in a company that had already listed shares on the futures market
(TSE 1963, Part on Institutions and Organizations, 3).
(i) Total paid-in face value (of the newly listed class of shares) must not
be less than 500,000 yen to be listed on the Tokyo or Osaka stock ex-
change.
(ii) Total paid-in face value (of the newly listed class of shares) must
not be less than 250,000 yen to be listed on a stock exchange other than
Tokyo and Osaka.
These criteria set by the MAC provided the minimum requirement that
a ﬁrm that wants to list its stocks had to satisfy. The TSE seems to have
evaluated some additional aspects that were not explicitly stated as well.
The internal rules of the TSE enacted in 1915 prescribed as follows (Re-
search Bureau of the Bank of Japan 1916, 93).
When a joint-stock company requests the TSE to start trading its stocks
or debentures, the TSE should examine its articles of incorporation as
well as its assets and business status to decide whether the request should
be approved or not (Article 1).
Moreover, the revised Exchange Act of 1922 obliged the exchange to set up
a council to decide on when a stock or a bond could be listed or delisted.
In May 1921, the listing criteria of the TSE were revised to be the fol-
lowing.
(i) Issuing ﬁrm must have been established more than 2 years ago.
(ii) Total face value (of the newly listed class of shares) must be more
than 3,000,000 yen, of which more than 1,000,000 yen already paid in;
the number of shares must be greater than 60,000.
(iii) For a new class shares of a company that had already listed shares
in the futures market, total face value (of the newly listed class of shares)
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already paid in; the number of shares must be greater than 40,000.
These new criteria were used at least until the beginning of the Sino-
Japanese War in 1937 (The Research Division of the TSE 1932; Hatano
1938).
In contrast to the futures market, the spot market of the TSE does not
seem to have imposed any explicit listing criteria. In a 1932 publication, the
TSE stated, “we do not impose any condition on the listing” (TSE 1932,
95) in the spot market. Although we ﬁnd several documents that spell out
the listing criteria for futures market as we saw above, we are not aware of
any documents that specify the listing criteria for the spot market. Thus, it
seems safe to conclude that the TSE did not have explicit listing criteria for
the spot market.
The companies that wished to be listed on the spot market were still re-
quired to apply for it. Even this requirement to apply for the listing, how-
ever, was eliminated in 1918, and the TSE decided that they can start trans-
action of a stock and quoting its price without the company’s application
to be listed on the exchange (TSE 1928, 88).
Figures 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 suggest that the change in 1918 had a major im-
pact on the subsequent increase of the size of the TSE. The number and
amount of shares listed on the TSE increased rapidly after 1918, especially
in the spot market.
According to TSE (1928, 88; and other relevant references), the change
in 1918 was motivated by the TSE’s attempt to bring the spot exchange
transactions that took place outside the exchange into the exchange.10
Since the late nineteenth century, stock trading outside the exchanges was
quite active (Kataoka 1987). A large number of stocks were traded over the
counters of spot market brokers (genbutsu don’ya) and saitori brokers in-
termediated between those brokers. In 1906, these brokers outside the ex-
change ﬁled an application to the local government of Tokyo to establish a
new stock exchange specialized in spot trading. This attempt was not ma-
terialized mainly due to the strong opposition from the TSE.
As the outside trading increased, the TSE started to try integrating those
trades inside the exchange. The spot market brokers also came to consider
that it was convenient to interlink their trading with the trading inside the
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10. This is in contrast to what happened in New York, where the curb market continued to
exist and competed with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). In the early twentieth cen-
tury, an oﬃcial document by the NYSE wrote “The curb market represents, ﬁrst, securities
that cannot be listed; second, securities in the process of evolution from reorganization cer-
tiﬁcates to a more solid status; and third, securities of corporations which have been unwill-
ing to submit their ﬁgures and statistics to the proper committees of the Stock Exchange”
(Michie 1987, 206–7). As the New York curb market started to trade shares of large compa-
nies listed on the NYSE, competing with the NYSE, “the over-the-counter market began to
emerge in New York, better known as the unlisted market,” providing competition for the
curb market. (Geisst, 1997, 165)TSE. Thus, in 1918, the TSE invited saitori brokers, who intermediated
spot transactions outside the TSE, to trade only inside the exchange (As-
sociation of the TSE Saitori Members 1975, 65, 72). The TSE also set up
the Monitoring Department (kansatsu-bu) to ensure that spot transactions
were conducted within the exchange and following the TSE rules (TSE
1928, 46; TSE 2002, 30; Association of the TSE SaitoriMembers 1975, 72).
This change made it diﬃcult for investors to trade shares outside the ex-
change.
The rapid increase of listed shares in the TSE after this 1918 reform may
not be surprising if it was just a result of the TSE’s newly listing the stocks
that had been traded outside the exchange by the spot traders. If this was
the only reason for the rapid expansion of the TSE, the growth would have
leveled oﬀ after a while, when most of the outside trading was already
brought inside the exchange. But ﬁgures 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 show the TSE con-
tinued to grow well into the late 1920s. Furthermore, as we examine below,
the integration of the outside trading took place rather quickly.
To study how the outside trading was absorbed into the TSE following
the 1918 reform, we collected the advertisement that a major spot broker,
Momijiya, ran in Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, a major newspaper in Tokyo. We
obtained the ﬁrst advertisement of Momijiya in the months of June and
December of each year from 1916 to 1921. Then we compared the stocks
on the Momijiya advertisement to the listed stocks on the TSE as of the end
of March of that year published in Kin’yu ¯ Jiko ¯ Sanko ¯sho. The result is sum-
marized in table 2.4.
Because the new listing policy of the TSE was implemented in September
1918 (TSE 1928, 88), the ﬁrst time we would observe that impact in table 2.4
is the June 1919 column, which compares the stocks advertised by Momi-
jiya in June 1919 to the stocks listed on the TSE in March 1919. We ﬁnd the
number of stocks advertised by Momijiya but not listed on the TSE, which
was around twenty before the change, fell to six by June 1919, and to zero
by December 1921. Thus, we can conclude that all the major stocks in the
outside market were quickly listed on the TSE following the change in 1918.
The outside market was completely absorbed by the TSE by 1921.
The TSE continued to grow even after 1921. This implies that the impact
of the policy change in 1918 was more than just absorbing the outside mar-
ket into the TSE. In this section, we examined if the changes in listing rules
on the TSE can explain the pattern of its growth. The listing criteria on the
futures market went through several changes, but those are not closely re-
lated to the changes in the growth rate of the TSE that we see in ﬁgures 2.3,
2.4, and 2.5. Moreover, the growth spurt in the 1920s, which is the most
prominent change, was mostly due to the expansion of the spot market.
The TSE does not seem to have explicit listing restrictions on the spot mar-
ket. Prior to 1918, the companies only had to apply to the TSE to be listed.
This rule changed in 1918, which led to the sustained growth of the spot





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.market. Then why did many companies fail to apply for listing before 1918?
Because they did not seem to have faced any listing criteria, this suggests
they did not ﬁnd the beneﬁt of being listed. Why? The next section builds
an explanation for these questions based on the recent literature on initial
public oﬀerings (IPOs).
2.6 Market Liquidity and the Decision to List Stocks
There is a large and growing literature on IPOs and listing decisions of
ﬁrms, but we ﬁnd the results of two recent papers especially relevant for
our purpose. They are Ellul and Pagano (2006) and Baruch and Saar
(forthcoming).
First, Ellul and Pagano (2006) shows that the extent of IPO underpric-
ing is high when the (expected) liquidity of the stock after the IPO is low.
Thus, underpricing, which constitutes an important part of the cost of
IPO, is decreasing in the expected aftermarket liquidity. Assuming there is
some variation in the beneﬁt of IPO across ﬁrms, so that only those ﬁrms
whose beneﬁts are higher than the costs decide to be listed on the stock ex-
change, we can argue that the number of ﬁrms that decide to be listed is a
increasing function of the expected liquidity.
Second, Baruch and Saar (forthcoming) provide an example that shows
(among other things) that the liquidity of an individual stock is an increas-
ing function of the number of ﬁrms listed in the market. Using an example
that is a more general case of Baruch and Saar (forthcoming), we show this
is indeed the case in appendix B.
Combining these two arguments, we can now establish that the number
of listed stocks is an increasing function of the market liquidity, which in
turn is an increasing function of the number of listed stocks. This implies a
possibility of multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium, the market liquidity
is expected to be high, which encourages many ﬁrms to be listed and makes
the market liquidity indeed high. In another equilibrium, the market liq-
uidity is expected to be low, which leads to a low number of listed ﬁrms and
low liquidity.
The key to the story here is externality. Market liquidity is an important
factor for a company decision to list its shares on the market, but when a
company makes its listing decision, it does not consider the eﬀect of its list-
ing on the market liquidity. In this sense, the argument here is closely re-
lated to the literature on multiple equilibria in the ﬁnancial market devel-
oped by Diamond (1987) and Pagano (1989a,b), for example. Pagano
(1989a) builds a model of risk-averse investors with endogenous supply of
corporate equity to show two (or more) equilibria. In one equilibrium, the
market for corporate equity is thin, and the price volatility is high, which
reduces both demand and supply of stocks and keeps the market thin,
while in the other equilibrium, the market is thick and the price volatility is
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that the positive feedback between trading volume and liquidity can lead
traders to concentrate all exchanges on a single market or create a parallel
market for large trades.
Applying the dual equilibria argument to the TSE in the prewar period,
we argue that the TSE before 1918 may have been in the low market liq-
uidity equilibrium. It was in equilibrium in the sense that that the ﬁrms who
were not listed did not have incentive to be listed given the existing level of
market liquidity. From this point of view, the listing policy change in 1918
can be viewed as an exogenous shock that increased the market liquidity.
This led to the listings of many companies that were previously not listed.
More important, the increased market liquidity should have convinced
some ﬁrms that they would be better oﬀ if their shares are listed. Thus, the
1918 policy reform may have shifted the equilibrium from the low liquidity
one to the high liquidity one.
The explanation here assumes that listing on the TSE during the prewar
period was very much like the IPO today. We can ﬁnd evidence that sug-
gests this characterization of listings is reasonable.
First, there are some anecdotes that show the companies decided to list
their stocks to increase the capital by attracting new shareholders. For ex-
ample, Noda (1980, 70–73) reports an example of Kyushu Railroad (Kyushu
Tetsudo). The Kyushu Railroad was established in 1888 with oﬃcial capi-
tal of ¥11 million, of which ¥7.5 million was planned to be funded initially.
Because the ﬁnancial market condition was rather tight in 1888, the share-
holders were required to pay only ¥5 per share (for the par value of ¥50 per
share) as the ﬁrst installment to acquire shares, but collecting such a small
portion was already diﬃcult. Only 38.0 percent of the shareholders made
the ﬁrst installment payment by the due date. For the second installment of
¥5 per share that was due in March 1989, only 11.6 percent of the share-
holders met the due date.
At this point, Seinosuke Imamura, a director of the Kyushu Railroad,
advised the president to list the Kyushu Railroad stock on a stock exchange
to facilitate the trades of the stock and to encourage the future installment
payments.11 Following this advice, the Kyushu Railroad listed shares on
the TSE and the OSE in 1989. The strategy was successful. The stock price
quickly rose above the par (paid-in) value, and the Kyushu Railroad did
not have trouble collecting installment payments in time (at least until the
ﬁnancial panic of 1890).
Another example is Miyagi Boseki Dento, which listed its shares on the
TSE in 1910. Miyagi Boseki started as a cotton spinning company in 1882
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11. Seinosuke Imamura was also one of the founders of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and a
large securities broker.near Sendai, Miyagi Prefecture. In 1888, it succeeded in generating elec-
tricity using water mills originally designed for cotton spinning machines.
In 1899, Miyagi Boseki merged an electricity company in the prefecture,
Sendai Dento, and changed the name to add “Dento”: Japanese for elec-
tric lamps (Kinugawa 1938, 338–46). In 1909, the company established the
ﬁrst hydroelectric power plant in Japan and started providing electricity for
lamps in Sendai.
Figure 2.8 shows the oﬃcial amount of capital, the paid-in capital, and
the amount of total assets (book value) for Miyagi Boseki Dento around
the listing. The ﬁgure shows that Miyagi ﬁnanced the investment (includ-
ing the building of the hydroelectric power plant) by collecting unpaid part
of the capital ﬁrst, until the existing shares were fully paid-in in 1909. The
company listed its shares on the TSE next year and issued new shares. The
ﬁgure suggests that the proceeds from the new share issues and subsequent
collection of unpaid part of new shares were used to ﬁnance the continued
expansion of Miyagi.
Figure 2.9 shows the number of shareholders and the top-ten share-
holders concentration rate for Miyagi during this period. Before the listing
of the shares in 1910, the number of shareholders gradually declined, and
the shareholder concentration increased. This suggests that some share-
holders failed to meet the required payments for the unpaid part of the
shares and lost their rights. After listing the stock in 1910, the number of
shareholders increased by more than 50 percent, and the shareholder con-
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Fig. 2.8 Assets and capital, Miyagi Boseki Dento
Source: Miyagi Boseki Dento, Business Report (various issues).centration started to come down, suggesting the listing enhanced the share-
holder base substantially.
The examples of Kyushu Railroad and Miyagi Boseki Dento show that
the companies consciously decided to list their stock on the stock exchange
to broaden the shareholder base and to increase the (paid-in) capital. The
listing on the stock exchanges indeed made it easier for the companies to
increase the capital.
Additional evidence that shows that listing on the stock exchange broad-
ened the shareholder base and made it easier for the company to raise cap-
ital comes from a database of thirty-nine major joint stock companies in
Tokyo during the 1890s. We divide the thirty-nine ﬁrms into three groups.
The stocks of eleven companies were already listed on the TSE before 1890.
Five companies are newly listed on the TSE between 1890 and 1899 (four
in 1893 and one in 1894). The remaining twenty-three companies were not
listed on the TSE (at least until 1900). Figures 2.10 and 2.11 respectively
show the average number of shareholders and the average amount of paid-
in capital for each of the three groups. To control for the size diﬀerence be-
tween these groups in 1890 so that we can focus on the diﬀerence in growth
experience during the 1890s, the ﬁgure shows the index number normaliz-
ing the average for each group in 1890 to be 100. The ﬁgure clearly shows
the newly listed ﬁrms increased the number of shareholders and the amount
of paid-in capital during the 1890s. The already listed ﬁrms and the un-
listed ﬁrms, on the other hand, did not increase the number of shareholders
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Fig. 2.9 Number of shareholders and ownership concentration of top-ten share-
holders, Miyagi Boseki Dento
Source: Miyagi Boseki Dento, Business Report (various issues).Fig. 2.10 Average number of shareholders, thirty-nine ﬁrms in Tokyo (1880   100)
Source: Tokyo Prefecture, Statistical Handbook of Tokyo Prefecture (various issues).
Fig. 2.11 Average amount of paid-in capital, thirty-nine ﬁrms in Tokyo (1880   100)
Source: Tokyo Prefecture, Statistical Handbook of Tokyo Prefecture (various issues).very much. They increased the amounts of paid-in capital, but the growth
rate was lower than that for the newly listed ﬁrms. 
2.7 Listing Decisions of Cotton Spinning Firms
In this section, we use the data from cotton spinning industry to test a
key implication of our argument that implies a listing decision depends on
the size of the stock exchange. If the stock market is large and has large liq-
uidity, the potential underpricing problem is mitigated, and the net beneﬁt
of listing increases. Thus, as a market expands, the likelihood of new list-
ings tends to go up. This section estimates a simple probit model that ex-
plains new listing decisions of cotton spinning ﬁrms.
Cotton spinning was a leading industry in prewar Japan, and many of
these companies were eventually listed on the TSE. More important, con-
sistent data are available on both unlisted and listed companies, which al-
low us to analyze what factors inﬂuenced the decision to be listed. The data
on cotton spinning ﬁrms are taken from the various issues of the Menshi
Bo ¯seki Jijo ¯ Sanko ¯sho(Reference Book on the Cotton Spinning Industry) pub-
lished by the Japan Cotton Spinning Association. The sample covers the
period between 1905 and 1936.
We take all the companies whose ﬁnancial data are available in the Men-
shi Bo ¯seki Jijo ¯ Sanko ¯sho and checked whether they were listed on the TSE
at the end of each year by referring to the materials used in section 2.3. Fig-
ure 2.12 presents an overview of the sample. The number of ﬁrms in each
year was twenty-ﬁve to thirty-ﬁve until the late 1910s and ﬁfty and seventy
after that. Of these, the number of ﬁrms listed on the TSE was ﬁve to six
until the late 1910s, and it increased to more than twenty in the late 1920s
and 1930s. The number of ﬁrms listed on the long-term futures market was
nine at the peak (1933 to 1935). Until 1932, the only ﬁrm listed on the
short-term futures market was Kanegafuchi Bo ¯seki. Nisshin Bo ¯seki was
added in 1933.
The cotton spinning industry in Japan was geographically concentrated
around Osaka (Takamura 1971). Reﬂecting this, the proportion of com-
panies located in the eastern regions (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, and
Chubu) was 42 percent at the peak (1936) and 14 percent at the bottom
(1914). (See ﬁgure 2.13.) Companies from the eastern regions nevertheless
represented a higher proportion of listed companies on the TSE. This sug-
gests that there was home bias with respect to listing on the TSE. The mag-
nitude of the bias substantially declined after the late 1910s.
To examine the determinants of listing on the TSE by cotton spinning
ﬁrms, we estimate a regression model similar to those estimated by Pagano,
Panetta, and Zingales (1998) in their study of the Italian IPOs. They ana-
lyzed the determinants of IPOs by using panel data of Italian ﬁrms in 1982
76 Yasushi Hamao, Takeo Hoshi, and Tetsuji OkazakiFig. 2.12 Number of cotton spinning ﬁrms listed on the TSE: 1905–1936
Source: See next.
Fig. 2.13 Regional bias of cotton spinning ﬁrms listed on the TSE
Source: See text.to 1992. Using the ﬁrms that conformed to the listing criteria for the Milan
Stock Exchange but were not listed, they regressed the dummy variable de-
noting IPO to several explanatory variables on corporate attributes and the
environment. They found that a ﬁrm is more likely to decide to go public if
the amount of sales is high, the sales growth is high, it has high return on
assets (ROA), and the ﬁrms in the same industry that are already listed
show high market-to-book ratio.
The probit model that we estimate is the following:
Pr(Lit   1)    [ 0    1 log(CAPit 1)    2 Ageit 1
   3 ROEit 1    4 Easti    5 log(TSEt 1)],
where Lit is the dummy variable that takes 0 if ﬁrm i has never listed on the
TSE as of year t. It takes 1 if the ﬁrm was newly listed on the spot market
of the TSE in year t. The companies that were newly listed on the TSE in
year t are dropped from the sample in year t   1 on. Thus, we try to esti-
mate the factors that inﬂuence the new listings. The expression  (·) de-
notes a cumulative normal distribution function. CAP is the paid-in capi-
tal normalized by the average paid-in capital of the total joint-stock
companies in Japan. Age is the years from the foundation of the ﬁrm. East
is the dummy variable that takes 1 if the headquarter of the ﬁrm was lo-
cated in the eastern regions of Japan, and 0 otherwise. Finally, TSEt is the
total amount of capital of the stocks listed on the spot market of the TSE
in year t. If the market size is the important determinant of listing decision
of individual ﬁrms, we expect to ﬁnd the coeﬃcient of TSE to be positive.
We estimate the regression separately for two subperiods: the period be-
fore 1918 and the period after 1918. The listing policy change in 1918 sug-
gests that the listings before 1918 were initiated by the ﬁrms. They had to
apply to be listed. Thus, by looking at the listing events, we can study what
factors inﬂuenced the ﬁrm’s decision to seek listing. After 1918, the TSE
was able to initiate the listing without any requests from the ﬁrms. Thus, we
can consider some listing events after 1918 continued to be the ﬁrms’ deci-
sion while some listing decisions were done solely by the TSE. The fact that
the listing observations after 1918 include these two diﬀerent types of de-
cisions makes it diﬃcult to interpret the regression result for this period.
Table 2.5reports the result. The ﬁrst column shows the estimation result
for the period before the 1918 change. The coeﬃcient on CAP is positive
though statistically signiﬁcant only at 10 percent level, suggesting that the
probability of listing was higher for large ﬁrms. The coeﬃcient on East is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, suggesting that there
was a home bias in listing on the TSE. The coeﬃcient on TSE is positive
though it is statistically signiﬁcant only at the 10 percent level.
Thus, the result from the period before 1918 suggests that large ﬁrms in
the eastern part of Japan were more likely to be listed on the TSE. It also
suggests larger market size of the TSE encouraged the ﬁrms to be listed on
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story.
The second column of table 2.5 reports the results from the period after
1918. Here the only statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient is CAP. This may be
a result of large ﬁrms continued to be more likely to be listed. Or this may
reﬂect the TSE’s preference toward large ﬁrms when they listed the stocks
without waiting for the applications. If we were able to distinguish the list-
ings initiated by the ﬁrms from those initiated by the TSE, we could check
whether the listings initiated by the companies continued to be inﬂuenced
by the market size after 1918 (which is a prediction of our story). Unfortu-
nately, we have not been able to ﬁnd such information so far.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
The size of the stock market relative to the size of national economy was
large in the late 1920s and 1930s Japan. During the ﬁrst forty years since
the establishment of the TSE in 1878, however, the market was relatively
small and the listed ﬁrms were concentrated in the areas close to Tokyo.
This chapter examined why the TSE stayed relatively stagnant during the
ﬁrst forty years and why it suddenly took oﬀ in the late 1910s.
We have found a small change in the TSE’s policy toward listing in its
spot market in 1918. Before 1918, the ﬁrms had to apply to the TSE to be
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Table 2.5 Probit model of listing decision
1905–1917 1918–1935










No. of observations 296 644
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes one if the company lists its
shares on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) in that year. ROE   return on equity. After the
listing event, the company is dropped from the sample, so that all the observations with the
dummy variable   0 are the companies that have never been listed on the TSE. The model is
estimated with probit estimation. Numbers in parentheses show the standard errors of the co-
eﬃcient estimates.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.listed. After 1918, the TSE started trading some stocks without explicit ap-
plications from those ﬁrms. We argue that this apparently small policy
change allowed the TSE to escape from the low liquidity equilibrium and
to take oﬀ.
The argument that we advanced to explain the existence of the low liq-
uidity equilibrium in the prewar stock market in Japan can be generalized
to consider stock market development in other parts of the world in other
times. The possibility that low expected liquidity discourages ﬁrms from
listing their stocks in the market and justiﬁes the expectation may be quite
general.
The self-conﬁrming nature of the expectation about the market liquidity
implies several interventions that may be necessary for stock exchanges in
developing economies to develop. The TSE solved the problem by listing
major companies without waiting for their applications to be listed. Alter-
natively, a stock exchange (or the government) may be able to subsidize
new companies to be listed on the stock exchange. Finally, there may be
ways to attract more traders to the stock exchange to increase the market
liquidity in general. In this case, what is more important for the liquidity
(in the sense that large transactions can take place without changing the
market price very much) is the presence of noise traders, as is shown by the
models of stock market microstructure (see, for example, Kyle 1985).
Appendix A
Compilation of Listing Data
We have compiled the list of all the listed stocks in 1878, 1885, 1900, 1915,
1925, and 1935.
The information for 1878 and 1885 was taken from the TSE (1928). The
TSE (1928) reports the listing (and delisting) dates for all the stocks on the
futures market. Similar information is not available for the stocks listed
only on the spot market, but this is not a problem for the period before
1896, when all the stocks on the spot market were also listed in the futures
market. Thus, we can use the data to create a complete list of listed stocks
for 1878 and 1885.
A complete list of the listed stocks and their face values is available in the
business reports of the TSE each year from 1900 to 1918. So we take the in-
formation for the years 1900 and 1915 from this source. With respect to
1925 and 1935, we take the data on the listed stocks and their face value
from the unpublished version of TSE business reports, held at the TSE.
The information on the capital of each company was taken from various
government reports, including Ginko ¯-ka Ho ¯koku (The Report of the Bank-
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of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance), Teikoku To ¯kei Nenkan
(The Imperial Statistical Year Book), and No ¯sho ¯mu To ¯kei Hyo ¯ (The Statis-
tics of Agriculture and Commerce).
In addition to these government reports, we used Zenkoku Shogaisha
Yakuinroku(Directory of Corporate Directors), 1900 and 1912 issues; Ginko ¯
Kaisha Yo ¯roku (Directory of Banks and Companies), 1925 and 1935 issues;
Teikoku Ginko ¯ Kaisha Yo ¯roku (Imperial Directory of Banks and Compa-
nies), 1925 issue; and Kabushiki Nenkan (Year Book of Corporate Stocks),
1926 and 1936 issues, to collect the location, establishment year, and in-
dustry of each listed ﬁrm. We use the industry classiﬁcation employed by
the TSE (1938).
The data show interesting changes of industrial composition of listed
ﬁrms over time. Of the twenty-four companies that had been listed before
1885, we see twenty of them were banks (and nineteen of them national
banks). The concentration of listed companies in banking is understand-
able because the National Bank Act was the only law that deﬁned joint
stock companies and the limited liability of shareholders (Miyamoto 1990;
Takamura 1996; Yoshida 1998, 28). Legislation for joint stock companies
in other industries had to wait till the Commercial Code of 1893.
By 1890, the number of listed companies increased to ninety-six. The
number of listed banks declined as the National Bank Act was phased out,
but many railway companies were newly listed. Companies in other indus-
tries, including coal and petroleum, cotton spinning, and other textiles and
foods, were also listed during this period.
By 1915, the number of listed companies increased further, and the in-
dustries represented became more diversiﬁed. There were 160 listed com-
panies. We can identify the industries for 151 of them. The share of the rail-
way companies declined to 21.2 percent. While new companies running
electric railways in the urban areas emerged, large railway companies dis-
appeared due to the nationalization of the main lines in 1906 (Noda 1980,
310–13). The electricity industry saw its share go up sharply from 1900 to
1915. The electricity companies, which were in the early stages of develop-
ment and needed large-scale investment, actively raised funds from the
stock market (Kikkawa 1995, chapter 1). Besides electricity, the shares of
such industries as coal and petroleum, sugar, and gas also went up in this
period.
By 1925, the number of listed companies reached 712, following the ex-
pansion of the spot market after 1918. The industries became even more di-
verse. The share of the railways, which still had the largest share, was only
8.3 percent. The shares of such industries as insurance, machinery, chem-
istry and metal, which developed during World War I, went up. In 1935,
919 companies were listed, and the industrial composition was similar to
that in 1925.
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This appendix shows that the market liquidity is an increasing function
of the number of ﬁrms listed in the market using a standard model of stock
market microstructure. Baruch and Saar (forthcoming) consider a special
case of this model and obtain a similar result.
Consider k listed stocks, whose fundamental values depend on n (  k)
signals:
(B1) V   M   FS    ,
where V is (k   1) vector of the fundamental values, M is (k   1) vector of
the mean fundamental values, Sis (n 1) vector of signals, Fis (k n) ma-
trix whose (i, j) element shows how the fundamental value of stock i is in-
ﬂuenced by the signal j, and   is (k   1) vector of idiosyncratic shocks. F
is assumed to have rank k.
We assume the signals are distributed normally, and the covariance ma-
trix of S is given by  2I, where I is the identity matrix. The idiosyncratic
shocks follow the standard normal distribution and are assumed to be in-
dependent with each other and with S.
Following Kyle (1985) and the related literature, we assume the market
price of a stock is determined by the market maker so that the price is equal
to the expected fundamental value of the stock given the order ﬂows the
market maker observes. Let Q be (k   1) vector of the orders by the in-
formed traders, who observe the values of S before they submit the orders.
The informed traders decide their position to maximize the expected proﬁt
from trading, given the pricing rule of the market maker. The market also
has noise traders, whose orders are denoted by (k 1) vector X. We assume
Xfollows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance  2
xI. The mar-
ket maker and both types of traders are assumed to be risk neutral.
Under the assumption of normal distributions, the equilibrium pricing
rule and hence the optimal trading strategy for the informed traders be-
come linear functions. Let us denote these as follows.
(B2) Q   BS
(B3) P   M    (Q   X),
where B is (k   n) matrix whose (i, j) element shows how the informed
traders adjust their order of stock i responding to signal j, P is (k   1) vec-
tor of the market prices of the stocks, and   is (k   k) matrix whose (i, j)
element shows how the market maker adjust the price of stock i when the
order ﬂow for stock jchanges. Note that the price cannot respond to Qand
X diﬀerently because the market maker cannot distinguish which orders
come from the informed traders.
The informed traders maximize their expected proﬁts from trading:
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where the superscript Tdenotes the transpose of the matrix, and Edenotes
the expectation operator. The ﬁrst order condition is given by:
FS    Q    TQ   0.
Thus,
Q   (     T) 1FS, which implies:
(B4) B   (     T) 1F
If we divide the variance-covariance matrix of the vector (VT, QT   XT)T
into submatrices as follows,
Var       .
Then, one can show:12
(B5) P   E[V | Q   X]   M   ΣVQ Σ 1
QQ (Q   X).
From equations (B1) and (B2), we can calculate:
(B6)
ΣVQ    2FBT
ΣQQ    2
xI    2BBT.
Substituting equation (B6) into equation (B5) and comparing the result
with equation (B3), it is straightforward to see:
(B7)      2FBT[ 2
xI    2BBT] 1   FBT  I   BBT 
 1
,
where hdenotes the square root of the signal to noise ratio (  2/ 2
x  ), which
shows up repeatedly in the following calculation.
If   is symmetric (which can be conﬁrmed), we can rewrite equation
(B4) to get:13
(B8) B     1F.
Multiplying equation (B7) from the left by  –1 and substituting equation
(B8), we get:
I   2BBT  I   BBT 
 1
.















Q   X
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12. See, for example, Anderson and Moore (1979, theorem 3.1, 25–28).
13. The algebra used to get to the equation (B9) follow appendix A of Baruch and Saar
(forthcoming).I   BBT   2BBT.
Thus, I   h2BBT.
Substituting equation (B8) into this, we get
(B9)   T   FFT.
The market liquidity is often deﬁned as “depth” of the market, which is
“the ability of the market to absorb quantities without having a large eﬀect
on price” (Kyle, 1985, 1330). Following this idea, we can argue the market
liquidity is inversely related to the “magnitude” of   because a “large”  
implies that the prices are very sensitive to any changes in order ﬂows. Here
we focus on the “magnitude” of   T because it moves in the same direc-
tion as the “magnitude” of  , and use the sum of the eigenvalues of this
matrix as the measure of the “magnitude.”
To consider how the market liquidity changes with the number of stocks
listed (k), let us partition the matrix F into the ﬁrst k – 1 rows and the 
kth row.
(B10) F    
Now G is [(k – 1)   n)] matrix, and g is (1   n) vector. Similarly, partition
  into a [(k – 1)   (k – 1)] matrix and the remaining parts.
(B11)       ,
where V is [(k – 1)   (k – 1)] matrix, v is [(1   (k – 1)] vector, and  kk is a
scalar.
Let  (k; j) denote the liquidity of the ﬁrst j stocks when k stocks are
listed, which we measure as the sum of the eigenvalues of the submatrix of
  T that contains the upper left j   j elements. Because the sum of the
eigenvalues is equal to the trace of the matrix, using equation (B9) and the
partition of F and  , we see:
(B12)  (k   1; k   1)   tr GGT,
where tr denotes the trace of the matrix.
To compare this to  (k; k – 1), we ﬁrst substitute equations (B10) and
(B11) into equation (B9) to get:
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Therefore,
trVVT   trvTvT   trGGT.
Because trvTvT is the sum of square of each element of v, it must be posi-
tive. Noting this, we establish:
 (k; k   1)   trVVT   trGGT   trvTvT   trGGT    (k   1; k   1).
Thus, the price response of a set of stocks becomes smaller when an ad-
ditional stock is listed on the market. In this sense, the market liquidity is
an increasing function of the number of stocks listed.14 The result has a
very intuitive interpretation. As the number of listed stocks grows, the in-
formation useful in predicting the fundamental value of a stock can be
found in the order ﬂows of many stocks, as long as their fundamental val-
ues are inﬂuenced by the same factors as well. Thus, the information re-
vealed by the order ﬂow of any single stock becomes smaller, leading to a
smaller price response to the order ﬂow (and, hence, increased liquidity).
References
Anderson, Brian D. O., and John B. Moore. 1979. Optima ﬁltering. Englewood
Cliﬀs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Association of TSE Saitori Members. 1975. Saitori Shi(History of Saitori). Tokyo:
Association of TSE Saitori Members.
Bank of Japan, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies. 1986. Wagakuni no
Kin’yu Seido (Financial system in Japan). Tokyo: Bank of Japan.
———. 1995. Wagakuni no Kin’yu Seido (Financial system in Japan). Tokyo: Bank
of Japan.
Baruch, Shmuel, and Gideon Saar. Forthcoming. Asset returns and the listing
choice of ﬁrms. Review of Financial Studies.
Cabinet Oﬃce. 2001. Kokumin Keizai Keisan Hokoku: Choki Sokyu Suikei (Report
on national accounts from 1955 to 1998). Tokyo: Printing Oﬃce of the Ministry
of Finance.
Demirgüc-Kunt, A., and R. Levine. 2001. Financial structure and economic growth:
A cross-country comparison of banks, markets and development.Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.


















Vv   vT kk
vv    2
kk
VVT   vTvT
vVT    kkvT
Listing Policy and Development of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 85
14. Baruch and Saar (forthcoming) also obtain this result for a special case, although this
is not the main focus of their paper.Ellul, Andrew, and Marco Pagano. 2006. IPO underpricing and after-market liq-
uidity. Review of Financial Studies 19:381–421.
Fujino, Sho ¯zaburo, and Ju ¯ro ¯ Teranishi. 2000. Nihon Kin’yu no Su ¯ryo ¯ Bunseki
(Quantitative analysis of Japan’s ﬁnance). Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha.
Geisst, Charles R. 1997. Wall Street: A history.New York: Oxford University Press.
Gordon, Robert J. 1986. The American business cycle. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press.
Hatano, Kanae. 1938. Shoken Shijo Ron (On the security market). Tokyo: Gan-
shodo Shoten.
Hoshi, Takeo, and Anil Kashyap. 2001. Corporate ﬁnancing and governance in
Japan: The road to the future. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ishii, Kanji. 1997. Nihon no Sangyo Kakumei (Industrial revolution in Japan).
Tokyo: Asahi Sensho.
———. 1999. Kindai Nohon Kin’yushi Josetsu(Towards the ﬁnancial history of mod-
ern Japan). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
Kataoka, Yutaka. 1987. Meijiki no Kabushiki Shijo to Kakaku Keisei.(The stock mar-
ket and price formation in Meiji Japan). Shakai Keizai Shigaku 53 (2): 159–81.
Kikkawa, Takeo. 1995. Nihon Denryokugyo no Hatten to Matsunaga Yasuzaemon
(Development of the electricity industry and Yasuzaemon Matsunaga). Nagoya,
Japan: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai.
Kinugawa, Taichi. 1938. Honpo Menshi Boseki Shi (History of the Japanese cotton
spinning), vol. 3. Osaka: Nihon Mengyo Kurabu.
Kuwata, Yuzo. 1940. Wagakuni Torihikijo no Riron to Jissai(Theory and practice of
the Japanese exchange). Toyko: Yuhikaku.
Kyle, Albert S. 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica
53:1315–35.
Michie, Ranald. 1987. The London and NewYork stock exchanges, 1850–1914.Lon-
don: Allen and Unwin.
———. 1999. The London Stock Exchange: A history. Oxford, UK: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Miwa, Yoshiro, and Mark Ramseyer. 2002. Banks and economic growth: Implica-
tions from Japanese history. Journal of Law and Economics 18 (1): 127–64.
Miyamoto, Matao. 1990. Sangyoka to Kaisha Seido no Hatten (Industrialization
and development of the corporate system). In Sangoyka no Jidai (Age of indus-
trialization). Vol. 1, ed. Shunsaku Nishikawa and Takeshi Abe, 352–401. Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten.
Noda, Masao. 1980. Nihon Sho ¯ken Shijo ¯ Seiritsu-shi: Meiji-ki no Tetsudo ¯ to
Kabushiki Kaisha Kin’yu (History of the formation of Japanese securities market:
Railroads and joint stock company ﬁnancing in Meiji). Tokyo: Yuhikaku.
Okawa, Kazushi. 1974. Kokumin Shotoku (National income). Tokyo: Toyo Keizai
Shinposha.
Okawa, Kazushi, Tsutomu Noda, Nobukiyo Takamatsu, Saaburo Yamada, Mi-
noru Kumazaki, Yuichi Shoinoya, and Ryoshin Minami. 1967. Bukka (Prices).
Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha.
Okazaki, Tetsuji. 1995. Nihon niokeru Koporeito Gabanansu no Hatten (Evolution
of corporate governance in Japan: An historical perspective). In Shisutemu
toshite no Nihon Kigyo (The Japanese ﬁrm as a system), ed. Masahiko Aoki and
Ronald Dore, 437–84. Tokyo: NTT Shuppan.
———. 1999a. Corporate governance. In The Japanese economic system and its ori-
gins, ed. Tetsuji Okazaki and Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 97–144. New York:
Oxford University Press.
———. 1999b. Mochikabu Gaisha no Rekishi: Zaibatsu to Kigyo Tochi (History of
86 Yasushi Hamao, Takeo Hoshi, and Tetsuji Okazakiholding companies in Japan: Zaibastu in Perspective of Corporate Governance).
Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho.
———. 2000. Mochikabu Gaisha to Ginko: Koporeito Gabanansu kara Mita 1920
Nendai to Gendai (Holding companies and banks: The 1920s and the present in
perspective of corporate governance). HitotsubashiBusiness Review48 (3): 38–50.
Okazaki, Tetsuji, Michiru Sawada, and Kazuki Yokoyama. 2005. Measuring the
extent and implications of director interlocking in the pre-war Japanese banking
industry. Journal of Economic History 65 (4): 1082–1115.
Osaka Stock Exchange. 1928. Daikabu 50 Nenshi (Fifty-year history of the Osaka
Stock Exchange). Osaka: Osaka Stock Exchange.
Pagano, Marco. 1989a. Endogenous market thinness and stock price volatility. Re-
view of Economic Studies 56:269–88.
———. 1989b. Trading volume and asset liquidity. Quarterly Journal of Economics
104:256–74.
Pagano, Marco, Fabio Panetta, and Luigi Zingales. 1998. Why do companies go
public? An empirical analysis. The Journal of Finance 53 (1): 27–64.
Research Bureau of the Bank of Japan. 1916. Tokyo ni okeru Kabushiki Shijo no
Yoko (Outline of the stock market in Tokyo). Tokyo: Bank of Japan.
Shimura, Kaichi. 1970. Nihon Shihonshijo Bunseki(Analysis of the Japanese capital
market). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
Takamura, Naosuke. 1971. Nihon Bosekigyo Shi Josetsu(An introduction to the his-
tory of the cotton spinning industry). Tokyo: Hanawa Shobo.
———. 1996. Kaisha no Tanjo (Birth of corporations). Tokyo: Yoshikawa
Kobunkan.
Teranishi, Juro. 2003. Nihon no Keizai Shisutemu (The economic system in Japan).
Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
Tokyo Stock Exchange. 1928. Tokyo Kabushiki Torihikijo Goju ¯-nenshi (Fifty-Year
History of the Tokyo Stock Exchange). Tokyo: Tokyo Stock Exchange.
———. 1937. Tokyo Kabushiki Torihikijo Tokei Nenpo (The yearly statistical report
of Tokyo Stock Exchange). Tokyo: Tokyo Stock Exchange.
———. 1938. Tokyo Kabushiki Torihikijo Shi (History of the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change). Vol. 3. Tokyo: Tokyo Stock Exchange.
———. 1963. Tokyo Shoken Torihikijo Ju-nenshi (Ten-year history of the Tokyo
Stock Exchange). Tokyo: Tokyo Stock Exchange.
———. 2002. Tokyo Shoken Torihikijo 50 Nenshi (Fifty-Year History of the Tokyo
Stock Exchange). Tokyo: Tokyo Stock Exchange.
Tokyo Stock Exchange, Research Division. (Cho ¯sa-ka). 1932. Tokyo Kabushiki
Torihikijo (Tokyo Stock Exchange). Tokyo: Tokyo Stock Exchange.
———. 2004. Tokyo Stock Exchange fact book. Tokyo: Tokyo Stock Exchange.
Toyo Keizai Shinposha. 1927. Meiji Taisho Kokusei Soran (Statistical handbook of
Meiji Taisho Eras): Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha.
Umemura, Mataji. 1988. Rodoryoku (Manpower). Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1937. Statistical abstract of the United States. Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Oﬃce.
U.S. Council of Economic Advisors. 2003. Economic report of the president. Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Oﬃce.
Yoshida, Junjo. 1998. Nihon no Kaisha Seido Hattatsu Shi no Kenkyu (Research on
the history of the corporate system in Japan). Ryugasaki, Japan: Ryutsu Keizai
Daigaku Shuppankai.
Listing Policy and Development of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 87